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MARCO ROSCINI*
GRAVITY IN THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND CYBER CONDUCT THAT CON-
STITUTES, INSTIGATES OR FACILITATES INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMES
ABSTRACT. This article explores the application of the gravity threshold to cyber
conduct that might fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It
first looks at how international crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court can be
committed, instigated or facilitated in and through cyberspace and then discusses the
problems that might arise when assessing gravity in this context. In particular, the
article applies the elements of the gravity assessment identified in the Court’s case-
law and by the Prosecutor, i.e. the identification of those ‘‘most responsible’’ for the
alleged crimes and certain quantitative and qualitative factors, in order to determine
the gravity of a case or situation involving cyber conduct.
I INTRODUCTION
The use of cyber technologies as a new means to commit, instigate or
facilitate crimes under the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s juris-
diction has so far received little attention in international criminal law
scholarship. Even the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Operations, published by a group of experts in 2017,
only devotes two rules (out of 154) to cyber international criminality.1
* Marco Roscini is Professor of Westminster Law School, University of West-
minster. The author is grateful to Dr. Marco Longobardo and to the anonymous
reviewers of this journal for their useful comments on previous versions of this
article. The usual caveat applies. Contact e-mail: m.roscini@westminster.ac.uk
1 See Rules 84 (Individual criminal responsibility for war crimes) and 85 (Criminal
responsibility of commanders and superiors): Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 391, 396, respectively. For a recent in-depth
assessment of the Tallinn Manual’s impact on state practice, see Dan Efrony and
Yuval Shany, ‘‘A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations
Criminal Law Forum (2019) 30:247–272  The Author(s) 2019
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With cyber crime continuing to increase in size, sophistication and cost
every year, we have reached the tipping pointwhere an examination of the
repercussions on international criminal law of this unprecedented phe-
nomenon has become necessary.2
This article explores one of the international criminal law issues
raised by the use of cyber technologies, i.e. the application of the
gravity threshold to situations and cases involving cyber conduct that
constitutes, instigates or facilitates international crimes under the ICC
jurisdiction. Indeed, as the Preamble of the Rome Statute affirms, the
Court was established to investigate and prosecute only ‘‘the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’’,3
while other crimes remain the domain of national jurisdictions. One of
themechanisms devised to ensure this division of labour is the inclusion
in the ICC Statute of a threshold of sufficient gravity that a situation or
case must cross for it to be admissible before the Court.4 How does this
threshold apply when it comes to criminal conduct in cyberspace?
In order to address this question, this article will proceed as follows. It
will first briefly look at how international crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC can be committed, instigated or facilitated in and through cy-
berspace and will then move to discuss the difficulties of assessing gravity
in this context. Inparticular, the articlewill distinguish the two elements of
the gravity assessment that, according to the Court, need to be taken into
account in order to determine the gravity of a case or situation, i.e. the
identificationof those ‘‘most responsible’’ for thealleged crimeson theone
handandcertainquantitative andqualitative factors on theother.Finally,
it will examine the differences in the assessment of the ‘‘legal’’ and ‘‘rela-
tive’’ gravity of situations and cases involving cyber conduct that consti-
tutes, instigates or facilitates international crimes.
Footnote 1 continued
and Subsequent State Practice’’, 112 American Journal of International Law (2018),
pp. 583–657.
2 On the definition of cyber crime, see Fausto Pocar, ‘‘Note sullo sviluppo della
normativa internazionale sui crimini relativi ai sistemi di informazione’’, in Studi in
Onore di Umberto Leanza, vol. I (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2008), pp. 633–635.
3 Preamble, Statute of the International Criminal Court, text in 2187 UNTS 3.
4 According to the Special Rapporteur James Crawford, the inclusion of gravity as
an admissibility threshold in the International Law Commission’s 1994 draft Statute
of the ICC had the purpose to avoid that the Court be ‘‘swamped by peripheral
complaints involving minor offenders, possibly in situations where the major
offenders were going free’’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2330, para. 9).
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II CYBER CONDUCT THAT MIGHT FALL UNDER
THE ICC JURISDICTION
In spite of the fact that, by 1998, states had already started to address
cyber criminality,5 this issue was completely ignored during the
negotiations of the Rome Statute and is therefore absent in the final
version of the treaty. Conduct in cyberspace, however, might fall
under the jurisdiction of the Court either because it constitutes a new
means to commit a crime over which the ICC has jurisdiction under
its Statute, or because it instigates or facilitates the commission of
such a crime.6
As to the former aspect, cyber attacks conducted by the belliger-
ents in the context of and associated with an armed conflict7 which
are, for instance, intentionally aimed at causing civilian casualties or
at destroying protected objects, or which are known to result in
‘‘incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’’, would
amount to war crimes under Article 8(2)(b)(i), (ii) and (iv), and
Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the Rome Statute. Indeed, cyber operations are
5 In 2000, the UN General Assembly also called upon states to ‘‘ensure that their
laws and practice eliminate safe havens for those who criminally misuse information
technologies’’ (UN General Assembly Resolution 55/63, 4 December 2000, para.
1(a)). Furthermore, a number of treaties have been concluded to address cyber
criminality. The 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, negotiated in the
framework of the Council of Europe and entered into force on 1 July 2004, requires
states parties to criminalize certain cyber offences in their domestic legislation, to
extend their jurisdiction to offences originating from their territory or by their
nationals, and to provide mutual assistance in investigations and prosecutions (the
text of the Convention is in 41 International Legal Materials (2002), pp. 282 ff.). An
Additional Protocol concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xeno-
phobic nature committed through computer systems was also adopted in 2003 and
entered into force on 1 March 2006 (ETS, n. 189). See also the African Union
Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection adopted on 27 June
2014 (text available at https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-cyber-se
curity-and-personal-data-protection).
6 See Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute. If cyber crimes are considered new crimes
and not new means to commit existing ones, on the other hand, their investigation or
prosecution by the ICC would be impossible as in conflict with the nullum crimen sine
lege principle (Article 22 of the ICC Statute).
7 ICC, Elements of the Crimes (2011), Article 8 ff., pp. 13 ff., https://www.icc-cpi.
int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.
pdf.
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able to produce damaging physical consequences in the analogue
world by corrupting the operating systems of physical infrastructures
such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems, which could result in the malfunction of such infrastructures
and possible loss of life or destruction of property: the textbook
example is a cyber attack conducted by a belligerent that shuts down
the cooling system of a nuclear power reactor located in enemy ter-
ritory, thus causing the release of radioactive substances that reach
indiscriminately civilians. If accompanied by the required dolus spe-
cialis,8 cyber attacks resulting in harmful physical consequences on
individuals might also constitute acts of genocide (Article 6(a)), or, if
they are ‘‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the at-
tack’’, crimes against humanity (Article 7(1)(a) and (b)), whether or
not they occur in the context of an armed conflict.
It is less likely, although not impossible, that a cyber attack could
in itself amount to the crime of aggression. The relevant scenarios are
those provided in Article 8 bis (2)(b) and (d) of the ICC Statute,
which refer respectively to ‘‘the use of any weapons by a State against
the territory of another State’’ and to ‘‘[a]n attack by the armed forces
of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of
another State’’.9 Cyber tools and capabilities can indeed be used as a
weapon to cause harm, and many national armed forces have now set
up cyber units.10 Article 8 bis (1), however, also requires that, to
entail individual criminal liability, the act of aggression must be ‘‘by
its character, gravity and scale… a manifest violation of the Charter
of the United Nations’’.11 This excludes minor uses of force and
legally controversial ones: it is unlikely, therefore, that a cyber attack
will be a manifest violation of the UN Charter because a) the scale of
the effects might not be significant or known enough, or attribution
8 According to Article 6 of the ICC Statute, an act of genocide requires an ‘‘intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such’’.
9 Anne-Laure Chaumette, ‘‘International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals
in Case of Cyberattacks’’, 18 International Criminal Law Review (2018), p. 8.
10 Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 9–10, 50–52.
11 Emphasis added.
MARCO ROSCINI250
might not be clear,12 and b) there is still debate on if and when a cyber
attack is a use of armed force (and a fortiori an act of aggression) and
thus falls under the scope of the jus ad bellum provisions of the
Charter.13 It is not surprising, therefore, that, during the negotia-
tions, some delegations expressed concern that, without an express
reference, the text of Article 8 bis would not cover cyber attacks.14
Cyber technologies could also be used to instigate or facilitate the
commission of crimes under the ICC jurisdiction. Accessory liability,
for instance, could be engaged through an act preparatory of geno-
cide like ‘‘a network intrusion to acquire the names of individuals
registered as a certain race in a State census in order to engage in
genocide’’.15 Individuals could also incite others to commit genocide
by posting comments to that aim on blogs, Twitter or other social
media. In relation to the international crimes committed in the Ka-
chin, Rakhine and Shan States since 2011, for instance, the Inter-
national Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar established
by the UN Human Rights Council noted the following:
The role of social media is significant. Facebook has been a useful instrument
for those seeking to spread hate, in a context where for most users Facebook is
the Internet. Although improved in recent months, Facebook’s response has
been slow and ineffective. The extent to which Facebook posts and messages
have led to real-world discrimination and violence must be independently and
thoroughly examined.16
In September 2012, Azerbaijan also denounced cyber attacks con-
ducted by a self-styled ‘‘Armenian Cyber Army’’ under the direction
and control of Armenia that were ‘‘aimed at glorifying terrorists and
insulting their victims, as well as at advocating, promoting and
12 Marco Roscini, ‘‘Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State
Responsibility for Cyber Operations’’, 50 Texas International Law Journal (2015), p.
233 ff.
13 Kai Ambos, ‘‘Individual Criminal Responsibility for Cyber Aggression’’, 21
Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2016), p. 495.
14 Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Resumed sixth session, New York, 2–6 June 2008, Report of the Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/6/20/Add.1, p. 14.
15 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1, p. 66.
16 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Commission on Myan-
mar, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, 24 August 2018, para. 74.
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inciting ethnically and religiously motivated hatred, discrimination
and violence’’.17
III GRAVITY IN THE ICC STATUTE
If it can hardly be doubted that, at least potentially, cyber conduct
might constitute, instigate or facilitate an international crime, for the
situation or case involving it to be admissible before the ICC it has to
be of sufficient gravity. In the ICC Statute, gravity is first and fore-
most an element of the crimes: there are several references to gravity
in the definition of crimes as contained in Articles, 6, 7, 8 and 8 bis.18
As already mentioned, for instance, Article 8 bis (1) states that an act
of aggression must be ‘‘by its character, gravity and scale … a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’’.19 Article 7
also provides that crimes against humanity must be ‘‘committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian
population’’. As to war crimes, Article 8(1) provides that the Court
prosecutes them ‘‘in particular when committed as part of a plan or
policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’’.20 The
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has acknowledged this ‘‘as statutory
guidance indicating that the Court should focus on war crimes
meeting these requirements’’.21 The PTC, however, found that ‘‘the
17 Letter dated 6 September 2012 from the Charge´ d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 7
September 2012, UN Doc. A/66/897–S/2012/687, p. 1.
18 Article 5 also states that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to ‘‘the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’’. The elements of
genocide and crimes against humanity imply that only grave conduct is envisaged
(William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (5th ed.,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 80; Margaret M. DeGuzman,
‘‘Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’’, 32 Fordham
International Law Journal (2009), p. 1407).
19 Understanding 7, adopted at the 2010 Kampala Review Conference together
with the definition of the crime aggression, explains that ‘‘[n]o one component can be
significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself’’ (Understandings
regarding the amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
on the Crime of Aggression, RC/Res.6, Annex III).
20 Article 8(2)(a) also includes ‘‘grave’’ breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
on the Protection of Victims of War in the list of war crimes, while subparagraph (b),
(c) and (e) refer to ‘‘serious’’ violations.
21 Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Article
53(1) Report, ICC-01/13-6-AnxA, 6 November 2014, para. 137.
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term ‘‘in particular’’ in article 8(1) implies that the existence of a plan,
policy or large-scale commission is not a condition for the Court’s
jurisdiction, contrary to what is provided for in article 7 with regard
to crimes against humanity’’ and that ‘‘such a plan, policy or large-
scale commission is unnecessary to establish the sufficient gravity in
accordance with article 17(l)(d)’’.22
Gravity, however, is also an admissibility threshold for the Court
to have jurisdiction (‘‘legal gravity’’):23 as Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) I
found, ‘‘the fact that a case addresses one of the most serious crimes
for the international community as a whole is not sufficient for it to
be admissible before the Court’’.24 As is well known, Article 17(1)(d)
of the ICC Statute provides that a case is inadmissible, and must then
be rejected, if it ‘‘is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by
the Court’’. Article 53 also provides that the Prosecutor cannot ini-
tiate an investigation or, after an investigation, proceed to a prose-
cution if she considers the case inadmissible under Article 17.25
Although both Articles 17 and 53 refer to ‘‘cases’’, the PTC found
22 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Decision Pursuant to Article
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/17, 12 April
2019, para. 65.
23 The expressions ‘‘legal’’ and ‘‘relative’’ gravity are borrowed from Ignaz Steg-
miller, The Pre-Investigation Stage of the ICC. Criteria for Situation Selection (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, 2011), pp. 316, 425; and Kai Ambos, Treatise on International
Criminal Law, Vol. III: International Criminal Procedure (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2016), p. 292.
24 Situation in the DRC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of
Arrest, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr, 10 February 2006, para. 41.
See also Situation in Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on
the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 31 March 2010, para. 56; Situation in the
Republic of Coˆte d’Ivoire, Corrigendum to ‘‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Coˆte d’Ivoire’’, Pre-Trial Chamber III, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, 15
November 2011, para. 201.
25 The decision of the OTP not to initiate the investigation of situations because of
insufficient gravity has so far occurred only twice: Iraq andMavi Marmara, and only
in the latter case was the decision challenged by the referring party (see OTP, Re-
sponse to Communications Received Concerning Iraq, 9 February 2006, pp. 8–9,
www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-response-iraq-06-02-09; Situation on
Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Article 53(1) Report, supra
note 21, paras. 133–148).
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that these provisions also apply to situations.26 When deciding
whether to start the investigation of a situation, in particular, the
Prosecutor needs to consider whether the potential cases likely to arise
from it are sufficiently grave.27 A potential case is defined ‘‘by way of
reference to: (i) the groups of persons involved that are likely to be
the object of an investigation for the purpose of shaping the future
case(s); and (ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court al-
legedly committed during the incidents that are likely to be the focus
of an investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s)’’.28 In
our context, therefore, the gravity assessment concerns both situa-
tions (also) involving potential cases related to criminal conduct in
cyberspace, and cases against a person accused of such conduct.29
In addition to being an element of the crimes and a non-discre-
tionary admissibility threshold, gravity also plays a third function in
26 Situation in Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute, supra
note 24, paras. 41–50. According to the PTC, ‘‘[t]he gravity threshold provided for in
article 17(1)(d) of the Statute must be applied at two different stages: (i) at the stage
of initiation of the investigation of a situation, the relevant situation must meet such
gravity threshold and (ii) once a case arises from the investigation of a situation, it
must also meet the gravity threshold provided for in that provision’’ (Situation in the
DRC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, supra note
24, para. 45).
27 Situation in Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome, supra note 24,
para. 58; Situation in Coˆte d’Ivoire, Corrigendum to ‘‘Decision Pursuant to Article
15 of the Rome Statute’’, supra note 24, para. 202; Situation in Georgia, Decision on
the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation, Pre-Trial Chamber I,
ICC-01/15-12, 27 January 2016, para. 53; Situation in Burundi, Decision Pursuant to
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Pre-Trial Chamber III, ICC-01/17-9-Red, 25
October 2017, para. 184. See also OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations,
November 2013, para. 59; Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and
Cambodia, Article 53(1) Report, supra note 21, para. 134.
28 Situation in Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome, supra note 24,
para. 59. See also Situation in Coˆte d’Ivoire, Corrigendum to ‘‘Decision Pursuant to
Article 15 of the Rome Statute’’, supra note 24, para. 204.
29 A crime is only an element of a case (Situation on Registered Vessels of the
Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia,
Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s
decision not to initiate an investigation, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/13-34-Anx, 16
July 2015, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Peter Kova´cs, para. 24). See also
Situation in Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome, supra note 24,
para. 65: a potential case for the purposes of assessing admissibility ‘‘encompasses
both crimes and one or several persons suspected to have committed those crimes in
the course of specific incidents’’.
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the ICC framework, that of guiding the decision of the Prosecutor on
the selection and prioritisation of admissible situations and cases to
investigate and prosecute (‘‘relative gravity’’).30 Relative gravity
‘‘aims at focusing the Court’s resources on the most serious available
situations and, generally, on the most serious cases within each sit-
uation’’.31 Unlike in legal gravity, when it comes to selecting or pri-
oritising situations and cases on the basis of relative gravity the
Prosecutor enjoys broad discretion.32
There is nothing in the ICC Statute or its drafting history that
sheds light on the factors to consider in order to assess the gravity of
situations and cases under Articles 17 and 53. From the ICC case-
law, however, it results that the gravity assessment is composed of
two elements: an evaluation of whether the persons that are likely to
be the object of the investigation or prosecution include those ‘‘most
responsible’’ for the alleged crimes, and an assessment of both
quantitative and qualitative factors, including the nature, scale,
manner of commission and impact of the alleged crimes.33 This two-
30 Articles 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c) of the ICC Statute. See deGuzman, supra note 18,
p. 1405; Ignaz Stegmiller, ‘‘The Gravity Threshold under the ICC Statute: Gravity
Back and Forth in Lubanga and Ntaganda’’, 9 International Criminal Law Review
(2009), p. 562; Susana Sa´Couto and Katherine Cleary, ‘‘The Gravity Threshold of
the International Criminal Court’’, 23 American University International Law Review
(2008), pp. 850–854. Gravity also has a fourth function, that of guiding the Court in
the determination of sentences (Article 78).
31 Stegmiller, supra note 23, p. 356.
32 Sa´Couto and Cleary, supra note 30, p. 854; Ambos, supra note 23, p. 293. In this
context, transparency is of course important (deGuzman, supra note 18, p. 1465). A
decision by the Prosecutor not to initiate an investigation can be reviewed by the
PTC upon request of the referring party (member state or the Security Council) or, if
the Prosecutor’s decision is based exclusively on ‘‘the interests of justice’’, by the PTC
motu proprio (Article 53(3)). In the former case, the PTC may only request the
Prosecutor to reconsider its decision, while in the latter case the decision not to
initiate investigations must be confirmed by the PTC.
33 See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-
Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, 8 February 2010, paras. 31–32; Situa-
tion in Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome, supra note 24, paras.
59–62; Situation in the Republic of Coˆte d’Ivoire, Corrigendum to ‘‘Decision Pur-
suant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute’’, supra note 24, paras. 203–204; Situation in
Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Authorization of an Investiga-
tion, supra note 27, para. 51; Situation in Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of
the Rome Statute, supra note 27, para. 184. Regulation 29(2) of the Regulations of
the Office of the Prosecutor, adopted in 2009, also indicates that an evaluation of
gravity must be made on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative factors,
including, but not limited to, the scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes,
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pronged assessment will now be applied to conduct in cyberspace that
constitutes, instigates or facilitates international crimes under the
ICC jurisdiction.
IV ‘‘THOSE MOST RESPONSIBLE’’ FOR THE ALLEGED
CRIMES
As to the first element of the gravity assessment, in the Mavi Mar-
mara situation the Prosecutor and the PTC explicitly disagreed on the
identification of the ‘‘most responsible person’’, or ‘‘those who bear
the greatest responsibility’’, for the crimes allegedly committed. In
particular, the OTP decided not to start an investigation because,
inter alia, there was not ‘‘a reasonable basis to believe that senior
IDF commanders and Israeli leaders’ were responsible as perpetra-
tors or planners’’:34 the OTP, therefore, intended ‘‘most responsible’’
as referring to the ‘‘most senior’’ persons. If one applies this rea-
soning in the context of cyberspace, a case against a senior military
commander who plans and orders multiple, damaging and unlawful
cyber attacks would be considered graver than a case against a
freelance hacker who, acting upon instructions, conducts the cyber
attacks.35 The problem is that rank and seniority could be difficult to
establish in our context, as actors in cyberspace often operate not on
the basis of hierarchical relationships but in ‘‘horizontal structures
and dynamics that depend more on cyber skills and (enemy) vul-
nerabilities than the capacity to command and control’’.36 In any
case, the PTC rejected the OTP’s reasoning because it limited the
Footnote 33 continued
as well as their impact (Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-
09, 23 April 2009, p. 17). See also OTP, 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Exami-
nations, supra note 27, para. 66; Situation in Coˆte d’Ivoire, Request of Authorisation
of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, ICC-02/11-3, 23 June 2011, para. 54;
Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia,
Article 53(1) Report, supra note 21, para. 135.
34 Prosecution Response to the Application for Review of its Determination under
Article 53(1)(b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/13-14-Red, 30 March 2015, para. 62.
The Prosecutor announced her decision not to investigate the Mavi Marmara inci-
dent in a sixty-one page report published in 2014 (Situation on Registered Vessels of
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Article 53(1) Report, supra note 21).
35 Dan Saxon, ‘‘Violations of International Humanitarian Law by Non-State
Actors during Cyberwarfare: Challenges for Investigations and Prosecutions’’, 21
Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2016), p. 564.
36 Ibid., at 570–571.
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jurisdiction of the Court only to certain categories of persons in
conflict with the Statute,37 and argued that the status of ‘‘most
responsible persons’’ is not dependent on considerations of seniority
or hierarchical position of those responsible for the alleged crimes.38
For the PTC, ‘‘most responsible’’ rather refers to those who played
the most significant role in the commission of the crime, whatever
their position or rank.39
Individuals do play different roles in cyber operations: they could
not only execute the payload and conduct the attacks, but also be
involved as co-perpetrators and accessories when they develop and
design the malware, recruit and train hackers, acquire the informa-
tion on the targeted system necessary to conduct the attack, provide
the hardware necessary to carry out the attack, and so on. Conduct in
cyberspace might also be aimed at instigating, aiding, abetting or
otherwise assisting the commission of traditional international
crimes, for instance by hacking into a system in order to obtain
classified information necessary to enable the international crime to
be committed, or by ‘‘posting online exhortations to continue the
slaughter of civilians of a particular religious group during an armed
conflict’’.40 It is worth recalling that, in many legal systems, the
37 The Preamble of the Statute affirms that the parties intended ‘‘to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators’’ of the crimes, not only for the most senior leaders,
and Article 27(1) provides that the ICC Statute ‘‘shall apply equally to all persons
without any distinction based on official capacity’’ (Situation in the DRC, Judgment
on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled
‘‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58’’,
Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04-169, 13 July 2006, paras. 78–79).
38 Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic
Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the request of the Union of
the Comoros, supra note 29, para. 23. See also Situation in the DRC, Judgment on
the Prosecutor’s Appeal, supra note 37, paras. 73–75. In relation to the crime of
aggression, however, Article 8 bis (1) of the ICC Statute limits the jurisdiction of the
Court only to senior leaders, i.e. those ‘‘in a position effectively to exercise control
over or to direct the political or military action of a State’’.
39 In the decision on Burundi, however, the PTC noted that ‘‘[i]n view of the
Prosecutor’s assertion that high-ranking officials of the Burundian government, the
police, the intelligence service and the military services, but also the Imbonerakure,
appear to be the most responsible for the most serious crimes, the Chamber accepts
that the persons likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping a
future case or cases are those who may bear the greatest responsibility for the alleged
crimes’’ (Situation in Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute,
supra note 27, para. 187).
40 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1, pp. 395–396.
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responsibility of accomplices or accessories is regarded as less grave
than that of those who commit the crimes.41
The problem with the application of the ‘‘most responsible’’ factor
in our context is that it might be difficult to obtain sufficient evidence
of attribution of the conduct, particularly at the preliminary exami-
nation stage. It is well known that anonymity is one of the main
characteristics of cyberspace. The internet, in particular, is a decen-
tralized system where the communications protocol divides the sent
data into several packets that take different unpredictable pathways
to reach their destination before being reassembled.42 An IP address
identifies the origin and the destination of the data: with the coop-
eration of the Internet Service Provider (ISP) through which the
system corresponding to the IP address is connected to the internet, it
could be associated with a person, group or state. The IP address,
however, could have been ‘‘spoofed’’, or the corresponding computer
system may only be a ‘‘stepping stone’’ for an attacker located else-
where.43 Providing sufficient evidence of the identity of the hacker so
to determine whether he/she is the ‘‘most responsible person’’, then,
might be a challenging task for the Prosecutor and will require the
cooperation of the states from which the cyber operation was con-
ducted.44 In 2013, the Office of the Prosecutor hired an expert in
41 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1, p. 395.
42 As has been observed, ‘‘the internet is one big masquerade ball. You can hide
behind aliases, you can hide behind proxy servers, and you can surreptitiously en-
slave other computers to do your dirty work’’ (Joel Brenner, America The Vulner-
able: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare (New
York: Penguin Press, 2011), p. 32).
43 Scott J. Shackelford and Richard B. Andres, ‘‘State Responsibility for Cyber
Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem’’, 42 Georgetown Journal of
International Law (2011), p. 982. The 1998 ‘‘Solar Sunrise’’ attack that broke into the
US Department of Defense’s system, for instance, was carried out by an Israeli
teenager and Californian students through a computer based in the United Arab
Emirates (Scott J. Shackelford, ‘‘From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber
Attacks in International Law’’, 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2009) 192,
p. 204).
44 The 2015 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security established by the UN General Assembly, for instance, recommends that
‘‘States should consider how best to cooperate to exchange information, assist each
other, prosecute terrorist and criminal use of ICTs [information and communication
technologies] and implement other cooperative measures to address such threats’’
(UN Doc. A/70/174 (2015), para. 13(d)).
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digital forensics for its Scientific Response Unit to improve its ability
to collect and analyse digital evidence.45
Having said that, at the preliminary stage the standard of proof is
not ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’, a standard which is only necessary
for convictions:46 it suffices that there is a ‘‘reasonable basis to pro-
ceed’’, as there is still no accused to protect and the Prosecutor acts
only on the basis of publicly available information.47 The evaluation
of admissibility, including gravity, is however stricter at the post-
investigation stage and the lack of sufficient evidence might be a
significant obstacle for the identification and prosecution of those
‘‘most responsible’’ for the crimes involving conduct in cyberspace.48
45 Human Rights Center, ‘‘Digital Fingerprints. Using Electronic Evidence to
Advance Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court’’, February 2014, p. 5,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Digital_fingerprints_interior_cover2.pdf.
On the use of digital evidence in ICC proceedings, see Eya David Macauley, ‘‘The
Use of EO Technologies in Court by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court’’, in Ray Purdy and Denise Leung (eds.), Evidence from Earth
Observation Satellites. Emerging Legal Issues (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2013), pp. 217–240;
Aida Ashouri, Caleb Bowers and Cherrie Warden, ‘‘The 2013 Salzburg Workshop
on Cyber Investigations: An Overview of the Use of Digital Evidence in Interna-
tional Criminal Courts’’, 11 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review
(2014), p. 115.
46 Article 66(3) of the ICC Statute.
47 Article 53(1). See Megumi Ochi, ‘‘Gravity Threshold before the International
Criminal Court: An Overview of the Court’s Practice’’, ICD Brief, 19, January 2016,
p. 15. It is worth recalling that, in contrast with the OTP, the PTC argued that ‘‘if…
the events are unclear and conflicting accounts exist, this fact alone calls for an
investigation rather than the opposite. It is only upon investigation that it may be
determined how the events unfolded’’ (Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union
of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on
the request of the Union of the Comoros, supra note 29, para. 36). For the PTC, in
other words, uncertainty favours investigations rather than the opposite. Therefore,
the investigations should be started even in the presence of insufficient or contra-
dictory information about the gravity admissibility threshold. This conclusion has
met with considerable criticism, including by the dissenting judge (Partly Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Pe´ter Kova´cs, supra note 29, paras. 6–12), as it would require the
Prosecutor ‘‘to open an investigation whenever there exists a scintilla of evidence, no
matter how persuasive, that might possibly satisfy the requirements of Article 53(1)’’
(Alex Whiting, ‘‘The ICC Prosecutor should Reject Judges’ Decision in Mavi
Marmara’’, Just Security, 20 July 2015, https://www.justsecurity.org/24778/icc-pro
secutor-reject-judges-decision-mavi-marmara).
48 Article 53(2) requires that there be a ‘‘sufficient basis’’ for prosecution, which is
arguably a higher standard than ‘‘reasonable basis to proceed’’ (Marco Longobardo,
‘‘Everything is Relative, Even Gravity’’, 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice
(2016), pp. 1022–1023).
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V THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ELEMENTS
OF THE GRAVITY ASSESSMENT
As to the second aspect of the gravity assessment, the ICC case-law has
indicated that an evaluation of gravity must be made on the basis of
both quantitative and qualitative factors, including, but not limited to,
the scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes, as well as their
impact.49 These factors have been applied by the OTP and the PTC to
assess the gravity of both situations and cases. They were for instance
applied by the Prosecutor in her decision not to start investigations on
theMavi Marmara incident because of insufficient gravity.50 The PTC
found that the factors used by the Prosecutor were appropriate, but it
concluded that they were applied incorrectly.51
The next pages will discuss how the qualitative and quantitative
factors identified by the OTP and the Court may affect the assessment
of the gravity of situations and cases involving cyber conduct that
constitutes, instigates or facilitates international crimes under the ICC
jurisdiction. It is worth recalling that these factors do not have a fixed
weight and must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each
case.52 Also, it is not essential that all conditions are satified, providing
that ‘‘the overall assessment demonstrates sufficient gravity’’.53
5.1 Scale
Scale includes, among others, ‘‘the number of direct and indirect
victims, the extent of the damage caused by the crimes, in particular
the bodily or psychological harm caused to the victims and their
families, or their geographical or temporal spread (high intensity of
49 See supra, note 33.
50 Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Article
53(1) Report, supra note 21, para. 138 ff. See the critical comments of Russell Bu-
chan, ‘‘The Mavi Marmara Incident and the International Criminal Court’’, 25
Criminal Law Forum (2016), pp. 497–498.
51 Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic
Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the request of the Union of
the Comoros, supra note 29, paras. 20–21.
52 William A. Schabas, ‘‘Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the
International Criminal Court’’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008), p.
740.
53 Melanie O’Brien, ‘‘Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of
United Nations Peacekeepers by the International Criminal Court’’, 10 Journal of
International Criminal Justice (2012), p. 543.
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the crimes over a brief period or low intensity of crimes over an
extended period)’’.54 On this basis, for instance, the OTP decided not
to open an investigation on the Mavi Marmara attack as the number
of victims was ‘‘relatively limited’’ compared to other cases investi-
gated by the Prosecutor.55 The number of victims has also been
considered important by the PTC, for instance in its decisions to
authorise investigations in the situations in Kenya and Georgia.56
As noted in Section II, it is not doubted that cyber attacks could
potentially cause significant physical damage to persons and objects.
One could think of a cyber attack that shuts down an electrical power
station in the middle of a harsh winter with consequent deaths among
the civilian population due to the low temperatures, or a cyber attack
that incapacitates computers controlling waterworks and dams, thus
generating floodings of inhabited areas, or that disables the air traffic
control system with consequent downing of civilian aircraft.57
It should be pointed out that cyber attacks can produce multiple
effects in the physical world.58 The primary effects are those on the
attacked computer system or network, i.e. the deletion, corruption, or
alteration of data or software, or system disruption through a Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack or other cyber attacks.59
54 OTP, 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 27, para. 62.
55 Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Article
53(1) Report, supra note 21, para. 138.
56 See Situation in Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome, supra note
24, paras. 190–191; Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for
Authorization of an Investigation, supra note 27, para. 5.
57 Some of these examples are made in the UK Attorney General’s speech at
Chatham House, ‘‘Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century’’, 23 May 2018,
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-
century.
58 William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, Technology, Policy,
Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities
(Washington: The National Academies Press, 2009), p. 80. See also Pia Paloja¨rvi, A
Battle in Bits and Bytes: Computer Network Attacks and the Law of Armed Conflict
(Helsinki: Erik Castre´n Institute of International Law, 2009), p. 32; William H.
Boothby, ‘‘Methods and Means of Cyber Warfare’’, 89 International Law Studies
(2013), p. 390.
59 Denial of service (DoS) attacks do not normally penetrate into the target system
but inundate it with excessive messages or requests in order to overload it and force
its shut down. Permanent DoS attacks are particularly serious attacks that damage
the system and cause its replacement or reinstallation of hardware. When the DoS
attack is carried out by a large number of computers organized in botnets, it is
referred to as a ‘‘distributed denial of service’’ (DDoS) attack.
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The secondary effects are those on the infrastructure operated by the
attacked system or network (if any), i.e. its partial or total destruction
or incapacitation. Tertiary effects are those on the owners of the
systems which are staging the cyber operation, for example the
owners of botnet-infected computers or of staging servers for exfil-
tration of stolen data, and on the users of the attacked system or
infrastructure, for instance those persons that benefit from the elec-
tricity produced by a power plant disabled by a cyber operation.60
Physical damage to property, loss of life and injury of persons, then,
are the secondary or tertiary effects of a cyber operation, not the
primary ones.
Scale includes not only the number of victims, but also an
assessment of geographical and temporal spread. Cyber operations,
however, might have a significant geographical spread but still result
in limited physical damage. The malicious worm Stuxnet, for in-
stance, spread to computers across several countries, including Iran,
Indonesia, India, Azerbaijan, United States and Pakistan, but only
allegedly caused physical damage to the Iranian uranium enrichment
facility in Natanz, while causing little harm to computers that did not
meet certain specific characteristics.61 DDoS attacks also often in-
60 These effects can be permanent (if the operation results in data loss or physical
damage), temporary (if data recovery is possible and functionality can be restored),
or transient (when normal functioning resumes immediately after the end of the
attack through rebooting or resetting the system). See Robert Fanelli and Gregory
Conti, ‘‘A Methodology for Cyber Operations Targeting and Control of Collateral
Damage in the Context of Lawful Armed Conflict’’, Christian in Czosseck, Rain
Ottis, and Katharina Ziolkowski (eds.), 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber
Conflict (CCDCOE, 2012), pp. 323–4.
61 In September 2010, it was reported that a computer worm, dubbed Stuxnet, had
attacked Iran’s industrial infrastructure with the alleged ultimate purpose of sabo-
taging the gas centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, one of the sites
where the IslamicRepublic is developing a nuclear programme (Nicolas Falliere, Liam
O Murchu, and Eric Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier, version 1.4, February 2011 www.
symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_
stuxnet_dossier.pdf). Even though an earlier version had already been released as early
as 2007, the worm– which presumably infiltrated the Natanz system through laptops
and USB drives, since it is not usually connected to the internet for security reasons –
mainly operated in three waves between June 2009 and May 2010. Stuxnet had two
components: one designed to force a change in the centrifuges’ rotor speed, inducing
excessive vibrations or distortions, and one that recorded the normal operations of the
plant and then sent them back to plant operators so to make it look as everything was
functioning normally (William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger, ‘‘Israeli
Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay’’, The New York Times, 15 Jan-
uary 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html).
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volve millions of botnets across several countries hijacked by a bot-
master, but they only cause temporary and reversible harm to the
target by shutting down the servers and systems overflooded with
requests: this might lead to the temporary interruption of services,
but not physical damage to persons or property. It is unlikely,
therefore, that, even assuming for the sake of argument that they
amounted to crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, operations
like the 2007 DDoS attacks on Estonia, which disrupted banking and
communications infrastructures in the Baltic country, would be
considered grave from a scale point of view in spite of their geo-
graphical spread, unless they also resulted in loss of life or destruction
of physical property.62
Be that as it may, the ICC Appeals Chamber found that the
conduct does not have to be ‘‘systematic or large scale’’ to cross the
gravity admissibility threshold, as this would introduce ‘‘at the
admissibility stage of proceedings criteria that effectively blur the
distinction between the jurisdictional requirements for war crimes
and crimes against humanity that were adopted when defining the
Footnote 61 continued
Although the exact consequences of the incident are still the object of debate, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran stopped feeding
uranium into a significant number of gas centrifuges at Natanz (William J. Broad,
‘‘Report Suggests Problems with Iran’s Nuclear Effort’’, The New York Times, 23
November 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/middleeast/24nuke.html).
While the worm was promiscuous, it made itself inert if the specific Siemens software
used at Iran’s Natanz enrichment plant was not found on infected computers, and
contained safeguards to prevent each infected computer from spreading the worm to
more than three others. The worm was also programmed to erase itself on 24 June
2012 (Jeremy Richmond, ‘‘Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet Demonstrate a Need
for Modifications to the Law of Armed Conflict?’’ 35 Fordham International Law
Journal (2011–2012), p. 856).
62 In 2007, a three week DDoS attack targeted Estonia, one of the most wired
countries in the world, shutting down government websites first and then extending
to newspapers, TV stations, banks, and other targets (Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska,
and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents. Legal Considerations (CCDCOE,
2010), pp. 18 ff., https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/legalconsiderations_0.pdf). The
attack, which, at least in its second phase, involved more than one million computers
based in over 100 countries hijacked and linked through the use of botnets, followed
the decision of the Estonian government to remove a Soviet war memorial from
Tallinn city centre and, overall, lasted almost a month. The attack caused some
limited economic and communication disruption, but no material damage, injuries,
or loss of life (Sean M. Watts, ‘‘Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-
Defense’’, 87 International Law Studies (2011), p. 70). Websites were also defaced and
their content replaced with pro-Russia propaganda.
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crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court’’.63 The Appeals
Chamber also noted that a requirement for ‘‘large scale and sys-
tematic’’ conduct in the context of Article 17(1)(d) of the ICC Statute
‘‘would not only render inutile article 8 (1) of the Statute contrary to
the principles of interpretation but would further contradict the ex-
press intent of the drafters in rejecting any such fixed requirement
therein’’.64
5.2 Nature
It is not essential, however, that a situation or case involves an
extensive number of casualties in order to justify investigation and
prosecution.65 Indeed, qualitative factors need also to be taken into
account. Nature ‘‘refers to the specific elements of each offence such
as killings, rapes and other crimes involving sexual or gender violence
and crimes committed against children, persecution, or the imposi-
tion of conditions of life on a group calculated to bring about its
destruction’’.66 This implies that certain crimes are by definition
graver than others: for instance, national and international sources
suggest that murder is considered the most serious crime from a
sentencing point of view.67 Crimes of sexual violence and those
involving torture and physical/psychological suffering are also con-
sidered serious, while – as recalled by the Trial Chamber68 – crimes
against property are considered comparatively less serious.69 The
argument according to which there is a hierarchy among crimes
63 Situation in the DRC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal, supra note 37,
para. 70.
64 Ibid., para. 71.
65 Situation in Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute,
supra note 27, para. 184. O’Brien argues that it is ‘‘essential to prosecute perpetrators
of mass atrocities that result in a comparatively ‘‘low’’ number of victims … as a
deterrent but also to demonstrate that such conduct is unacceptable to the inter-
national community’’ (O’Brien, supra note 53, p. 544).
66 OTP, 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 27, para. 63.
67 DeGuzman, supra note 18, p. 1452.
68 Situation in Mali, Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber VIII, ICC-01/12-01/
15-171, 27 September 2016, para. 77.
69 Situation in Mali, Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber VIII, ICC-01/12-01/
15-171, 27 September 2016, para. 77. See DeGuzman, supra note 18, p. 1452; Kevin
Jon Heller, ‘‘Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute’’, in Carsten Stahn and
Larissa van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspectives in International Criminal Justice
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010), p. 230.
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within the jurisdiction of the Court, and war crimes in particular, is
controversial, as it does not find an explicit basis in the letter of the
Statute.70 If it is accepted, however, cases involving cyber attacks that
only cause damage to physical property (like the case of Stuxnet)
might not be considered grave enough by their nature especially if
compared to other cases involving killing or physical suffering. As
will be seen, this argument seems more appropriate for the assessment
of gravity in the selection and prioritisation of admissible cases by the
OTP rather than for gravity as an admissibility threshold.71
Individuals might be responsible not only for acts, but also for
omissive conduct in cyberspace, particularly in the case of superior or
command responsibility for failure to prevent or repress a cyber
operation constituting, instigating or facilitating an international
crime conducted by someone under their effective control (Article 28
of the Rome Statute): in the Ali decision, the PTC considered
untenable the defence’s argument that a case concerning omissions
could never be of sufficient gravity, as such conclusion is inconsistent
with the letter, object and purpose of the Statute.72
5.3 Manner of Commission
Criteria to assess this factor include, inter alia, ‘‘the means employed
to execute the crime, the degree of participation and intent of the
perpetrator (if discernible at this stage), the extent to which the crimes
were systematic or result from a plan or organised policy or otherwise
70 Schabas, supra note 18, p. 81; Stegmiller, supra note 23, p. 352; Marco Lon-
gobardo, ‘‘Factors Relevant for the Assessment of Sufficient Gravity in the ICC.
Proceedings and the Elements of International Crimes’’, 3 Questions of International
Law (2016), p. 40, http://www.qil-qdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/03_ICC-
Gravity-Test-_LONGOBARDO_FIN-2.pdf.
71 See infra, Section VI.
72 Situation in Kenya, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09-02/
11-382-Red, 23 January 2012, para. 46. In the 2016 Policy Paper on Case Selection
and Prioritisation, the OTP stated that it ‘‘considers that the responsibility of
commanders and other superiors under article 28 of the Statute is a key form of
liability, as it offers a critical tool to ensure the principle of responsible command and
thereby end impunity for crimes and contribute towards their prevention’’ (Policy
Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, para. 36). It has been
observed that ‘‘command responsibility is most likely to trigger liability when cyber
units are integrated into the army and are part of regular operations’’ (Elies van
Sliedregt, ‘‘Command Responsibility and Cyberattacks’’, 21 Journal of Conflict and
Security Law (2016), p. 521).
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resulted from the abuse of power or official capacity, and elements of
particular cruelty, including the vulnerability of the victims, any
motives involving discrimination, or the use of rape and sexual vio-
lence as a means of destroying groups’’.73 The different degrees of
participation that characterize individuals involved in cyber opera-
tions have already been mentioned.74 The means employed to execute
the crime, in our case, are malware and cyber infrastructures like
computers and servers, which are unlikely to be an aggravating factor
as such (unlike, for instance, the use of electrocution, machetes and
prohibited weapons).75 Intent might be difficult to discern in the cy-
ber context, as malware can function unpredictably due to technical
errors or insufficient knowledge of the targeted systems. Cyber
operations, however, can be characterized by cruelty, for instance in
the case of a cyber operation that changes the medical data of pa-
tients so that they receive the wrong, painful or unnecessary treat-
ment.
It has been suggested that the context of an aggressive war is also an
aggravating factor in the evaluation of gravity.76 The cyber espionage
group Fancy Bear, for instance, has been accused of infecting, under
the instructions of Russia, an ‘‘app’’ that allowed the Russian forces to
access phone communications and localisation data of the Ukrainian
artillery and thus to attack it. This was of course not a war crime as the
target was a military objective, and it was not even an attack under
73 OTP, 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 27, para. 64.
In the Report on the Mavi Marmara, for instance, the Prosecutor looked at whether
the alleged crimes were ‘‘systematic or resulted from a deliberate plan or policy to
attack, kill or injure civilians or with particular cruelty’’ (Situation on Registered
Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Article 53(1) Report, supra note 21,
para. 140).
74 See supra, Section IV.
75 Cruelty, for instance, was emphasised by the PTC in Situation in Kenya,
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute, supra note 24, paras. 192, 199;
and Situation in Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute, supra
note 27, para. 188.
76 William A. Schabas and Mohamed M. El Zeidy, ‘‘Article 17’’, in Otto Triffterer
and Kai Ambos (eds.), The Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary
(3rd ed., Mu¨nchen/Oxford/Baded-Baden: C.H. Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), p. 815. See
also the Comoros’ letter of referral in relation to the Mavi Marmara, 14 May 2013,
para. 25, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/Referral-from-Comoros.pdf.
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Article 49(1) of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of Victims of War.77 But assuming, for
the sake of argument, that it did constitute a war crime, the fact that it
was committed in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine
would be – according to the above opinion – an aggravating factor.
This view, however, is not persuasive, for at least two reasons. First, it is
unclear how the Prosecutor could establish, at the preliminary exam-
ination stage, that the context is that of an aggressive war, i.e. a jus ad
bellum violation, particularly if the Court cannot exercise its jurisdic-
tion over the crime of aggression in that situation or case. Secondly,
considering the context of an aggressive war as an aggravating factor
risks conflating the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello and thus under-
mining the principle of the equality of belligerents. The ICC has so far
not supported the view that the context of an aggressive war is an
aggravating factor in the evaluation of gravity.
5.4 Impact
Impact can result, among others, from ‘‘the sufferings endured by the
victims and their increased vulnerability; the terror subsequently in-
stilled, or the social, economic and environmental damage inflicted
on the affected communities’’.78 Impact, then, has two aspects: the
direct impact on the victims and the broader impact on the com-
munity.79 According to the PTC, the impact beyond the victims can
be relevant in order to determine sufficient gravity, but its absence
does not necessarily negate gravity.80
77 On when a cyber operations constitutes an ‘‘attack’’ under the law of armed
conflict, see Roscini, supra note 10, pp. 178–182. On cyber espionage and the law of
armed conflict, see also Marco Longobardo, ‘‘(New) Exploitation and (Old) Inter-
national Humanitarian Law’’, 77 Zeitschrift fu¨r ausla¨ndisches o¨ffentliches Recht und
Vo¨lkerrecht (2017), pp. 809–134.
78 OTP, 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 27, para. 65.
See also Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for Authorisation of an
Investigation pursuant to Article 15, ICC-01/09-3, 26 November 2009, paras. 56, 59.
79 Stegmiller, supra note 30, p. 561. In the Mavi Marmara decision, in order to
measure the impact beyond the victims the PTC refers to the fact that the events were
highly publicised and that several fact-finding missions resulted from the incident
(Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic
Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the Request of the Union of
the Comoros, supra note 29, para. 48).
80 Ibid., para. 47. It has been noted that the impact criterion, like the controversial
‘‘social alarm’’ factor used in the much criticised decision of the PTC in Situation in
the DRC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article
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The inclusion of this factor in the assessment of gravity entails that
even cases that result in a low number of victims on the basis of
quantitative requirements might be grave enough from a qualitative
perspective if they have significant impact.81 For instance, cyber at-
tacks resulting in death of peacekeepers and humanitarian workers
could have a substantial impact because of the importance of
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and of the deterrent effect
they could have on them.82 Cyber attacks committed to influence
political elections might also have a significant impact on the com-
munity.83 In August 2017, for instance, the Kenyan opposition
claimed that hackers had manipulated the results of the recent elec-
tions by breaking into the database of Kenya’s electoral commission
so to acquire data on the electorate and draft a targeted campaign
strategy.84 This is, as such, not an international crime, but at least 24
people were killed in the violence that erupted after the contested re-
election of President Kenyatta.85 Certain cyber attacks might also
have repercussions on a country’s economy, as in the case of the 2007
DDoS attacks against Estonia. More in general, cyber attacks that
target national critical infrastructures, thus disrupting the provision
of essential services to the society, will have more significant impact
Footnote 80 continued
58, supra note 24, paras. 47, 64, 67, 77 (decision subsequently reversed by the Ap-
peals Chamber, Situation in the DRC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against
the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I, supra note 37, para. 72), is more a policy than a
legal criterion and should therefore be applied only in relation to relative gravity
(Ambos, supra note 23, p. 287).
81 For Heller, however, ‘‘[i]t is almost unconceivable that, when committed in
isolation, even the most systematic and socially alarming crimes with relatively few
victims could create the kind of situation that would draw the OTP’s attention’’
(Heller, supra note 69, p. 243).
82 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra
note 33, para. 33; Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for
Authorization of an Investigation, supra note 27, para. 55.
83 Heller, supra note 69, pp. 236–237.
84 Talita De Souza Dias, ‘‘Propaganda and Accountability for International
Crimes in the Age of Social Media: Revisiting Accomplice Liability in International
Criminal Law’’, Opinio Juris, 4 April 2018, http://opiniojuris.org/2018/04/04/pro
paganda-and-accountability-for-international-crimes-in-the-age-of-social-media-re
visiting-accomplice-liability-in-international-criminal-law.
85 As has been observed, ‘‘the use of social media to manipulate elections and to
provide other types of assistance to international crimes can potentially give rise to
individual criminal responsibility under international law’’ (De Souza Dias, supra
note 84).
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on the broader community than those on other infrastructures,
especially if their effects are long-term. Not only social and economic
damage should be considered in this context, however, but also that
to the natural environment: one could think, for instance, of a cyber
attack on a chemical plant intended to cause the release of hazardous
substances into the ocean during an armed conflict.86
VI LEGAL AND RELATIVE GRAVITY OF SITUATIONS
AND CASES INVOLVING CRIMINAL CONDUCT
IN CYBERSPACE
The Prosecutor has so far not clearly distinguished between legal and
relative gravity in the application of the above mentioned factors, i.e.
between gravity as an admissibility threshold and gravity as a dis-
cretional factor in the selection and prioritisation of cases.87 It seems,
however, that, for legal gravity, the threshold should not be very
high.88 Indeed, ‘‘the gravity threshold appears essentially to provide a
backstop ensuring that the Court rejects cases of crimes that tech-
nically meet the definitions in the Statute, but are nonetheless min-
or’’.89 As Ambos notes, ‘‘the definitional gravity’ of the ICC crimes
entails a presumption in favour of legal gravity and [...] the additional
gravity threshold is practically only relevant with regard to war
crimes’’.90 The result is that, in practice, legal gravity should essen-
tially preclude investigation and prosecution only of small scale,
isolated war crimes, but generally not of acts of genocide or crimes
against humanity, i.e. crimes which are grave per se.91 Only an iso-
lated cyber attack against protected persons or objects in the context
86 The 2016 Policy Paper suggests that ‘‘the Office will give particular considera-
tion to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, or that
result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of
natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land’’ (2016 Policy Paper, supra note
72, para. 41).
87 Stegmiller, supra note 23, p. 331.
88 Stegmiller, supra note 23, p. 351.
89 DGuzman, supra note 18, p. 1440.
90 Ambos, supra note 23, p. 294.
91 DeGuzman, supra note 18, p. 1457–1458; Stegmiller, supra note 23, pp. 351, 355.
For Stegmiller, legal gravity can be applied only exceptionally to crimes against
humanity and aggression. The PTC has also found that torture is a crime which is
grave ‘‘per se’’ (Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Decision Pursuant
to Article 15 of the Rome Statute, supra note 22, para. 85).
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of and associated with an armed conflict which results in negligible
damage and little impact, therefore, would not cross the legal gravity
threshold.92 On the other hand, cyber conduct constituting, insti-
gating or facilitating an act of genocide will not need to result in a
high number of casualties to be considered admissible. The same low
threshold should be applied to the assessment of the legal gravity of
both situations and cases: ‘‘in the first scenario, the crimes of the
overall situation are evaluated; in the second scenario, just the crimes
within the specific case can be evaluated’’.93
It is in the assessment of relative gravity for the selection and
prioritisation of situations and cases that the Prosecutor has broader
discretion.94 Indeed, ‘‘the relative gravity threshold is rather high, in
any case higher than the legal gravity threshold’’.95 This is confirmed
in a Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation published by
the OTP in 2016, which states that ‘‘the Office may apply a stricter
test when assessing gravity for the purposes of case selection than that
which is legally required for the admissibility test under article 17’’.96
As Ambos notes, the individual circumstances of the alleged perpe-
trator, including their role as ‘‘most responsible’’ in the commission
of the crime, could be taken into account when assessing the relative,
not legal, gravity of a case.97 Furthermore, quantitative and quali-
tative criteria can be considered on an equal basis in the relative
gravity evaluation.98 Finally, relative gravity allows for decisions
made on a comparative basis between pending and potential cases
before the Court.99 Even cases involving cyber conduct that could be
92 Stegmiller, supra note 23, p. 352.
93 Stegmiller, supra note 23, p. 354.
94 As Ambos notes, however, the Prosecutor ‘‘must act independently, impartially,
and objectively investigating all parties to a conflict without favouring or discrimi-
nating against any one of them’’ (Ambos, supra note 23, p. 378). See also Carsten
Stahn, A Critical Introduction fo International Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2019), p. 348.
95 Ambos, supra note 23, p. 294.
96 2016 Policy Paper, supra note 72, p. 13, para. 36.
97 Ambos, supra note 23, p. 293.
98 Stegmiller, supra note 23, p. 352. For Ambos, qualitative factors should be
applied primarily to relative gravity and only exceptionally to gravity as an admis-
sibility threshold, while quantitative factors can be applied in both contexts (Ambos,
supra note 23, pp. 293, 295).
99 Stegmiller, supra note 23, p. 355. Comparative gravity analysis in the context of
admissibility, on the other hand, is problematic (Stahn, supra note 94, p. 330).
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considered admissible under Article 17, therefore, might not be
investigated or prosecuted by the OTP if the number of victims is
significantly lower than in other comparable cases. On the other
hand, it is not to be excluded that the Prosecutor might decide to
select certain situations and cases involving the commission, insti-
gation or facilitation of international crimes through cyber conduct
because of their impact or to deter them in the future, even if they
resulted in a lower number of victims than in other cases.100
VII CONCLUSIONS
It is entirely possible that certain situations and cases involving cyber
conduct that constitutes, instigates or facilitates international crimes
under the ICC jurisdiction could be considered admissible from a
gravity perspective. As has been seen, cyber conduct can potentially
satisfy all the factors identified by the Court for the determination of
gravity. As with crimes committed by traditional means, legal gravity,
as an admissibility threshold, should not be a bar to the investigation
or prosecution of acts of genocide and crimes against humanity
committed, instigated or facilitated through cyber means, and should
only be applied to cyber war crimes in order to exclude ‘‘those
committed in isolation from other crimes, causing the least harm, and
by the lowest level perpetrators’’.101
Whether the Prosecutor will actually decide to select and prioritise
admissible situations and cases involving cyber conduct over other
situations and cases is a matter that falls within her prosecutorial
discretion, and in which quantitative and qualitative gravity factors
can be taken into account on an equal basis together with the sub-
jective circumstances of the alleged perpetrator and pragmatic and
operational considerations: the Prosecutor, then, might decide to
investigate or prosecute one case involving cyber conduct but come to
100 The 2016 Policy Paper states that the OTP ‘‘will pay particular attention to
crimes that have been traditionally under-prosecuted’’ in order to help end impunity
and prevent such crimes (2016 Policy Paper, supra note 72, p. 15, para. 46). On the
problems raised by ‘‘thematic’’ investigation and prosecution, see Stahn, supra note
94, pp. 350–351.
101 DeGuzman, supra note 18, p. 1458.
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a different conclusion in another because of comparative considera-
tions, the likelihood of identifying and apprehending the suspect, or
the availability of evidence.102
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